I predict that the next generation of attacks will be an inside job - an
armed pilot who is an airline employee shooting his co-pilot and being
protected by the new ultra secure cockpit doors.

With all of the anti-terrorist hysteria, no one is looking at the worst case
unanticipated consequence scenarios. We would probably be a lot better off
with no weapons or locks on board any aircraft at all, and rely on the
passengers to keep or retake control. No one will ever sit by and meekly
permit a hijacking again after 9/11.

Mike Schumann

"DALing" daling43[delete]-at-hotmail.com wrote in message
...
which illustrates the fallacy about what the "old" system assumed - not
using the aircraft ITSELF as a weapon. Focusing on the "old rules" of
"hijack" rather than the "new' (as in 'current') rules of hijack - what
goes
on the back of the aircraft is SECONDARY to prevention of the take-over of
the aircraft controls itself and that pax will take whatever action they
can
to prevent the situation from manifesting itself. Contrary to what they
will undoubtedly find, as was demonstrated by the Pennsylvania plane, once
it became clear that the intent was to crash the plane somewhere, the PAX
took action (exactly what the result of that action (as in speculation
that
the hijackers crashed in order to prevent capture) was will probably
either
never be known or alternsatively never be released). That action can be
expected to be repeated as a FIRST rebuff to any attempt to commandeer an
aircraft. Which is also why I support the position of 'keep off the bombs
and guns and the pax will fend for themselves quite nicely". No entry to
the flight deck during flight. but the focus of this investigation is
more
akin to locking the barn door after the horse is out of the barn.
(hindsight ALWAYS being 20-20)

You gotta knife? better stick me with it fast or you'll EAT it.
(capturing
the hijacker is an option - kiilling THEM is another option - which ever
is
easier)

"None" wrote in message
k.net...
WASHINGTON (AP)--The Federal Aviation Administration focused on the
danger
of explosives aboard planes rather than a suicide hijacking before the
Sept.
11, 2001 attacks even though its own security officers warned terrorists
might try to crash an airliner, a federal panel said Tuesday.

The FAA's Office of Civil Aviation Security considered the risk of a
suicide
hijacking at least as early as March 1998, says the preliminary report
by
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.

The commission report acknowledges there was no specific intelligence
indicating suicide hijackings would occur but says the FAA still had a
responsibility to protect the flying public against such a threat.

The commission wrapped up two days of hearings that focused on aviation
and
border security lapses. The panel, which has been investigating the
Sept.
11
attacks for a year and has held seven public hearings, wants Congress to
extend its May 27 deadline by at least two months, saying it needs more
time
to review all the material.

At Tuesday's hearing, the commission provided documents showing the FAA
was
aware of the possibility of suicide hijackings but didn't pass the
information along to airlines.

In a presentation to airline and airport officials in early 2001, the
FAA
discounted the threat of a suicide hijacking because there was "no
indication that any group is currently thinking in that direction." And
when
the agency issued a terrorism warning to air carriers in July 2001, it
noted
the risk of explosives inside luggage but did not mention suicide
hijackings.

At a commission hearing, panel member Timothy Roemer read from an FAA
document published in the Federal Register on July 17, 2001, stating
that
terrorism could occur "anytime, anywhere" in the U.S. and cautioning
that
the risk "needs to be prevented and countered."

"The dots are connected and they're large," said Roemer, a former
Democratic
congressman from Indiana. "Why didn't they result in a change in
policy?"

Cathal L. Flynn, former associate administrator of civil aviation
security
at the FAA, responded that the agency only had a generalized sense of
the
risk and that security efforts were hampered somewhat by poor
communication
with the FBI.

"It isn't that we disregarded them. There were disconnects," he said.
"How
would you coerce a pilot to fly into a building that's got people in
it?...How would you do that? The notion of a full-fledged al-Qaida
member
being a pilot ... did not occur to me."

Executives from United Airlines(NASDAQ-OTCBB:UALAQ) and American
Airlines
told the commission they rely on the FAA and federal agencies to provide
guidance on aviation security as well as counterterrorism efforts. They
proposed a more integrated security plan to improve coordination among
federal agencies.

Other preliminary findings disclosed Tuesday by the commission:

-Nine of the 19 Sept. 11 hijackers had been stopped by the airlines for
additional security screening.

-Weaknesses in airport screening of carry-on baggage in the 20 years
prior
to 2001 were rampant and widely reported in popular literature, which
the
hijackers apparently read and used to their advantage.

The 10-member, bipartisan commission was established by Congress to
study
the nation's preparedness before Sept. 11, 2001 and its response to the
attacks, and to make recommendations for guarding against similar
disasters.