Robert Green wrote:

Apparently the onboard ACRS? sends maintenance, performance data
back, similar to Airbus that went down near Brazil. But Malaysian
airlines chose not to participate in Boeings data collection,
but Boeing says MA did use the system themselves.

It's not clear if the choice to not buy the data collection service from
Boeing means that telemetry (to who? to where?) still takes place.

Presumably MA wouldn't need a telemetry link for such data, as they
could simply pull the data off the planes manually when-ever they felt
like it - since the planes are in their possession on a frequent basis.

What needs to happen is that fake "Transponder OFF" switches need
to go into these cabins so that when someone tries to turn it off
(why they even CAN be turned off is another issue)

The "off" switch is used routinely to turn off the transponder when
planes are on the ground (parked, in hangars, etc) so that ATC screens
are not cluttered by useless information.

It's a tough call as to how to make them automatic. I'd say that if an
interlock can be reasonably well engineered, that if the plane's wheels
are up, then the beacons are supplied by power that can't be turned off
from the cockpit.

I think that's a remarkably strong concern to them. What bothers
me more is that if they were so lax in checking passports,
how well did they screen the luggage for explosives?

Bulletproof passport checking requires real-time data and protocal links
to every conceivable authority in the world that can issue an opinion
about any given passport, and the cost to "subscribe" or participate in
such a network must have little or zero cost to end users (airlines,
airports) if stakeholders (gov'ts, law enforcement, societies) want to
experience 100% compliance everywhere.

And it must happen in a way that does not require humans to do more
things than they do now (press more buttons, flip through more screens,
etc) and a lack of data must not be interpreted as a "thumbs-down" which
causes a holdup during checkin or boarding. The implimentation and
day-to-day functioning of such a system requires talents and cooperation
that extend far beyond the staff at any given airport or boarding gate.

To link the competency of such passport checking (which is a distributed
human effort) to the competency of explosive checking (which is an
effort soley performed by specific local humans at any given location)
is not logical.

Wouldn't hijackers want to start off toward their destination as
soon as possible? Hijacking or suicide crash dives are possibilities,
but hijacking requires considerable sophistication and the newest
information implies they would know how to turn off both transmitters.

Hijack - implies taking control of the plane away from the pilots, with
several possible intentions:

- (a) Direct or fly the plane safely to an alternate location that
the hijackers could not otherwise travel to using legal means.

- (b) Direct of fly the plane safely to an alternate location to
hold the plane and passengers hostage in exchange for some
political or financial demand.

- (c) Direct or fly the plane into a target (a-la 9/11). In other
words, to use the plane as a weapon against a hardened target
for political or religious reasons.

For any of the above, it becomes a question as to how necessary it is to
turn off the plane's various transmission sources to render it
"invisible" from normal ground operations. Presumably the thinking is
that any plane that has been hijacked anywhere in the world for any
reason will be shot down as the primary response, so the best
countermeasure for the hijacker is to make the plane as invisible as
possible as soon as possible after the hijacking event has started.

We know (or we think we know) that the plane was not deemed to have been
hijacked and thus not shot down by any gov't in the area. We think we
know that the plane did not land at an alternate airport, and no ransom
demand was made (or at least made public).

If the plane went down due to a struggle for control as a result of
hijacking, we must conclude the initial stages of the hijacking was
successful as it probably entailed turning off the identification beacon
- something that would imply the hijackers had "comfortable control" of
the plane. A struggle for control of the plane would have happened
later - possibly hours later - presumably after passengers had come to a
consensus about the situation, gathered their courage, forumated plan,
etc.