Why the river?

Jim Davis wrote:

Let's just face it. The pilot had to make a quick decision. In this case,
he made the right choice. If someone had to do the same thing next week, it
may not turn out so good.

Had the aircraft broken up and killed everyone upon impact with the
river, you might not be so quick to state that the pilots made the right
choice.

We'll have to wait for the NTSB's analysis of the situation, analysis of
whether the aircraft had enough energy to make it to any nearby airport
or not (and if so, if there was any amrgin or if it was very close).

Remember that the NTSB's role is not to fault pilots. But looking at the
thought process of the crew and what information they had available at
the time the decision was made, the NTSB may recommend aircraft be
equipped with automatic display of distance/time estimates as soon as it
becomes a glider, along with distance to nearby airports.

"John Doe" wrote in message
...
Jim Davis wrote:

Let's just face it. The pilot had to make a quick decision. In this
case,
he made the right choice. If someone had to do the same thing next week,
it
may not turn out so good.

Had the aircraft broken up and killed everyone upon impact with the
river, you might not be so quick to state that the pilots made the right
choice.

You didn't get what I said. I said "in this case".

We'll have to wait for the NTSB's analysis of the situation, analysis of
whether the aircraft had enough energy to make it to any nearby airport
or not (and if so, if there was any amrgin or if it was very close).

It definately will be interesting to see what NTSB's conclusion will be.

Remember that the NTSB's role is not to fault pilots. But looking at the
thought process of the crew and what information they had available at
the time the decision was made, the NTSB may recommend aircraft be
equipped with automatic display of distance/time estimates as soon as it
becomes a glider, along with distance to nearby airports.

As a retired Air Canada captain, i can say that all pilots have a mental
image of a glide path based on many years of ILS approaches.

A quick look at the available landing sites would easily confirm whether
you would be above or below this imaginary glide path,,this being with
the aircraft under power.

The Captain made a decision based on this image and the fact that the
aircraft was not powered.

You can read about Rome all you want, but until you have actually been
there you really have no concept of what it is like.

The Professor wrote:
As a retired Air Canada captain, i can say that all pilots have a mental
image of a glide path based on many years of ILS approaches.

A quick look at the available landing sites would easily confirm whether
you would be above or below this imaginary glide path,,this being with
the aircraft under power.

The Captain made a decision based on this image and the fact that the
aircraft was not powered.

You can read about Rome all you want, but until you have actually been
there you really have no concept of what it is like.

How much more difficult is it to picture landing at an airport(or
river) that you can't see because it's behind you as opposed to one
you can see out the front or side window ?

wrote in

m:

How much more difficult is it to picture landing at an airport(or
river) that you can't see because it's behind you as opposed to
one you can see out the front or side window ?

Attempting to turn back to the departure airport was undoubtedly not a
good option. The turn back to the airport results in a significant
loss of vertical lift.

--

Micro wrote

How much more difficult is it to picture landing
at an airport(or river) that you can't see
because it's behind you as opposed to one
you can see out the front or side window ?

In my judgement the co-pilot, who was flying, started a turn back to the
general area of departure at the first sign of trouble, while the
Captain was assessing the landing opportunities.

You must remember that the aircraft was probably in about a 10 degree
nose up when the trouble occured. It would be impossible to see the
ground from this attitude. You would have to wait until the aircraft was
in level flight, or in this case in a controlled descent.

At some point in time a judgement was made that the available landing
strips, for the previously stated reason, were not in reach.

Experience would dictate that, from 3000 feet, the departure runway
would not be a viable option and would have nothing to do with whether
you could see it or not.