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#21
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SHOCKING (BBC Radio): UK Minister admits spying on Annan - Katherine Gun released
On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 23:09:26 +0100, "Oelewapper"
wrote: Why do you keep referring to the BBC Hutton saga: that story is no longer relevant, No, it is eminently relevant to a consideration of the contemporary conflict between the government and the BBC. since the original Gilligan report is now widely accepted to have been correct and accurate, Widely accepted by people who prefer to believe in accordance with their prejudices. Almost every claim *Almost*..... by Gilligan immediately turned out to be accurate, except .....*except* for the one the government chose to challenge them over. He made a lot of claims, most of which were not suported by the available evidence. Reporting individual spook's gossip as gospel was idiotic when the senior spook management were always going to line up behind the government. Isn't it odd that the govt. picked on a single 6.07am unscripted broadcast containing an accurate and sincere, but 'insufficiantly substantiated' (because 'single-sourced') claim - No, it's not odd at all. The government picked on one of the few things they knew any inquiry would vindicate them over, and the BBC were stupid enough to accept a challenge on those grounds. You don't like it? Tough. Meanwhile you're letting your annoyance at their tactical awareness cloud your judgement. The larger issues about going to war or not were never part of the Hutton remit. On Iraq, Tony Blair hasn't only committed faul play, both domestically and internationally; by bugging the U.N.'s Secretary General office he has just also 'crash-tackled' the referee. It's high time for regime change in Whitehall. So exercise your vote after applying some objective judgement to the situation. End of problem. Gavin Bailey |
#22
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SHOCKING (BBC Radio): UK Minister admits spying on Annan - Katherine Gun released
"Thomas J. Paladino Jr." wrote in message
... I think that the US and UK both have tremendous reason to doubt both his credibility and impartialty. I disagree, but if that's what they think then they should come out and say so. As it is it just looks like we're in the dirty tricks business. As it is widely known now, a good deal of high-ranking UN officials were taking massive kickbacks from Saddam via the corrupted 'Oil-For-Food' program, and had absolutely no interest in seeing that come to an end. As opposed to replacing it with a War for Oil program? Si |
#23
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SHOCKING (BBC Radio): UK Minister admits spying on Annan - Katherine Gun released
"Simon Robbins" wrote in message ... "Thomas J. Paladino Jr." wrote in message ... I think that the US and UK both have tremendous reason to doubt both his credibility and impartialty. I disagree, but if that's what they think then they should come out and say so. As it is it just looks like we're in the dirty tricks business. I think they have pretty much done just that, in many, many ways. If anyone over the last two years hasn't gotten the point that the US and the UK don't trust the UN and it's officials, then they have either been living under a rock or are hopelessly dense. The UN is fast becoming an adversarial, if not an all-out enemy organization. We have the absolute right and responsibility to spy on our adversaries and enemies. Hell, from time to time, it's prudent to even spy on friends. Such is the nature of international relations. As it is widely known now, a good deal of high-ranking UN officials were taking massive kickbacks from Saddam via the corrupted 'Oil-For-Food' program, and had absolutely no interest in seeing that come to an end. As opposed to replacing it with a War for Oil program? HA! Yes, of course. That is just soooo clever. You people just can't seem to let go of that one, despite all the evidence to the contrary. We haven't commandeered the Iraqi oil industry, we are fixing it and giving it back to them in July. In fact, our oil prices have gone up slightly. But I guess 'war for oil' just has too much of a ring to it to let go of, no matter how laughable it's become. |
#24
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SHOCKING (BBC Radio): UK Minister admits spying on Annan - Katherine Gun released
"Thomas J. Paladino Jr." wrote in message ...
"Simon Robbins" wrote in message ... "Brian Colwell" wrote in message news:QTx%b.626023$ts4.537678@pd7tw3no... It just amazes me how everyone seems to be surprised by these recent events, every country is constantly carrying out security (spying) operations on a continuous basis. The only thing different in this case, was the leakage of information. I find it very disturbing that someone employed in a highly sensitive occupation would go public. The ramifications of this type of behavior in a world that is vulnerable to terrorist attacks is, in my opinion, criminal. I don't find it shocking, just saddening. What possible justificatoin could there be under the grounds of national security for spying on the head of the UN? Unless they doubt his impartiality or credibility, the only reason seems to be to help us load the decks in our favour during negotiations, knowing what conversations he'd had with other council members or his own private advisors. Maybe we should ask ourselves whether we'd be as happy as our governments seem to be at brushing it aside if for example it had been Iraq, Syria, or even France or the Russians that had been caught at it? I very much doubt it would be being treated so casually by Downing Street or Washington if the culprits weren't members of our allied Axis of Angels. I think that the US and UK both have tremendous reason to doubt both his credibility and impartialty. As it is widely known now, a good deal of high-ranking UN officials were taking massive kickbacks from Saddam via the corrupted 'Oil-For-Food' program, and had absolutely no interest in seeing that come to an end. That's right, even China was getting a piece of the lucrative Iraqi post-sanction redevelopment pie. Well, except US and UK, whos oil companies were shut out by Saddam since 1990 (hence the two invasions). I think it is also widely known now, the false pretext of WMD was a ploy for US and UK to get their oil companies back into the region thru colonialism and imperialism, the same modus operandi since 1953 vis-à-vis Iran. |
#25
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SHOCKING (BBC Radio): UK Minister admits spying on Annan - Katherine Gun released
"charles liu" wrote in message m... "Thomas J. Paladino Jr." wrote in message ... "Simon Robbins" wrote in message ... "Brian Colwell" wrote in message news:QTx%b.626023$ts4.537678@pd7tw3no... It just amazes me how everyone seems to be surprised by these recent events, every country is constantly carrying out security (spying) operations on a continuous basis. The only thing different in this case, was the leakage of information. I find it very disturbing that someone employed in a highly sensitive occupation would go public. The ramifications of this type of behavior in a world that is vulnerable to terrorist attacks is, in my opinion, criminal. I don't find it shocking, just saddening. What possible justificatoin could there be under the grounds of national security for spying on the head of the UN? Unless they doubt his impartiality or credibility, the only reason seems to be to help us load the decks in our favour during negotiations, knowing what conversations he'd had with other council members or his own private advisors. Maybe we should ask ourselves whether we'd be as happy as our governments seem to be at brushing it aside if for example it had been Iraq, Syria, or even France or the Russians that had been caught at it? I very much doubt it would be being treated so casually by Downing Street or Washington if the culprits weren't members of our allied Axis of Angels. I think that the US and UK both have tremendous reason to doubt both his credibility and impartialty. As it is widely known now, a good deal of high-ranking UN officials were taking massive kickbacks from Saddam via the corrupted 'Oil-For-Food' program, and had absolutely no interest in seeing that come to an end. That's right, even China was getting a piece of the lucrative Iraqi post-sanction redevelopment pie. Well, except US and UK, whos oil companies were shut out by Saddam since 1990 (hence the two invasions). Man, you people are really living on another planet. Don't you see how far you have to go to stretch reality to make it fit your own political worldview? You say we have been looking to get our oil companies back into Iraq, "hence the two invasions", although before the FIRST invasion our companies WERE there. Our companies had to leave BECAUSE we invaded. If it were about oil, we would have valued our relationship with Saddam and never invaded in the first place. And if it were about simply taking over their oil fields, why did we even leave in the first place? We controlled most of the country, and taking Baghdad would have been easy at that point. But we pulled out after Iraq left Kuwait. If it were really 'about oil' wouldn't we have stayed? It just isn't logical, considering that after the first gulf war, we ended up with LESS oil available than we started with. I think it is also widely known now, the false pretext of WMD was a ploy for US and UK to get their oil companies back into the region thru colonialism and imperialism, the same modus operandi since 1953 vis-à-vis Iran. Again, logic and reality seem to escape you. Our 'oil companies' have been active in every country in the region except Iraq for the last 10 years. Iraq has an archaic and low-yield oil production capability. We waged a war costing over $100 Billion so far, and sure to cost more. We are fixing the Iraqi infrastructure at our taxpayers expense, then turning it over to the Iraqi government, at a cost not even determined yet. If we were really looking to make some kind of a profit from all of this, it just is not going to happen. Ever. It is just not possible. Will we then be able to purchase oil from Iraq? Sure. Will it be at a relatively favorable rate? Probably. Will it ever balace what we have spent or are going to spend? Nope. From a business standpoint, it is simply a bad deal. Now, if profit were truly the sole motivating factor in our relationship with Iraq, it would have been FAR more cost effective to simply leave Saddam in power, lift sanctions and renew diplomatic ties, thus allowing all of our oil companies back in there, free to profit from Saddam's relative stability as a brutal dictator. THAT would have been profitable. Reprehensable, but profitable. Ironically, that is almost exactly what many of our 'allies' who were against the invasion were doing. And that is why they didn't want the invasion, because it would have cost them money. So eliminating profit as a motivating factor in the invasion, what's left? Hmmmm..... maybe it was about security after all. But I'm sure you won't let logic and facts and reality get in your way. Your ilk never have before, why start now? |
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SHOCKING (BBC Radio): UK Minister admits spying on Annan - Katherine Gun released
"Thomas J. Paladino Jr." wrote in message ... If anyone over the last two years hasn't gotten the point that the US and the UK don't trust the UN and it's officials, then they have either been living under a rock or are hopelessly dense. That's nonsense. What we don't trust the UN to do is buy into our slapdash intelligence and extrapolated speculation to endorse a war. So we couldn't convince a majority of members that there were WMDs and an immediate threat. Well hey, they were right. I think it's more the other way around. On the whole the UN is a respectable organisation, and it's members simply don't trust us. You people just can't seem to let go of that one, despite all the evidence to the contrary. We haven't commandeered the Iraqi oil industry, we are fixing it and giving it back to them in July. In fact, our oil prices have gone up slightly. But I guess 'war for oil' just has too much of a ring to it to let go of, no matter how laughable it's become. It's not about comandeering the industry, but about ensuring it's kept in friendly hands that are more willing to do business our way to our financial advantage. I find it laughable that anybody discounts the oil angle, since it's painfully obvious there was no military threat, and ordinarily we don't give two hoots about human rights. Si |
#27
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SHOCKING (BBC Radio): UK Minister admits spying on Annan - Katherine Gun released
"Simon Robbins" wrote in message ... "Thomas J. Paladino Jr." wrote in message ... If anyone over the last two years hasn't gotten the point that the US and the UK don't trust the UN and it's officials, then they have either been living under a rock or are hopelessly dense. That's nonsense. No, it's reality. What we don't trust the UN to do is buy into our slapdash intelligence and extrapolated speculation to endorse a war. Actually, the UN depends wholly on our intelligence for nearly all of it's major policy decisions. So we couldn't convince a majority of members that there were WMDs and an immediate threat. Well hey, they were right. That's total bull****. NOBODY at the UN or anywhere else had said that Saddam didn't have WMD's before the war. Everyone believed that he had them, and everyone was wrong. Period. Hell, there's even evidence that Saddam himself thought he had them. The arguments being made at the UN against the war were that Saddam (and his sons after him) could be 'contained' in perpetuity (by our military and at our expense of course). We now know that most of those arguments were being made by individuals and entities which were taking massive kickbacks to the tune of several billion dollars per year by Saddam himself, through the horrendously corrupted 'oil for food' program. So they had just a tiny bit of a hidden agenda. I think it's more the other way around. On the whole the UN is a respectable organisation, and it's members simply don't trust us. Now that is truly laughable. The UN... which gives countries led by brutal dictators the same voice as liberal democracies, is a respectable organization? The UN, whose 'human rights' council is chaired by none other than Lybia and Iran? Respectable? HA! The fact that they 'don't trust us' is probably far more of a compliment then a derision. You people just can't seem to let go of that one, despite all the evidence to the contrary. We haven't commandeered the Iraqi oil industry, we are fixing it and giving it back to them in July. In fact, our oil prices have gone up slightly. But I guess 'war for oil' just has too much of a ring to it to let go of, no matter how laughable it's become. It's not about comandeering the industry, but about ensuring it's kept in friendly hands that are more willing to do business our way to our financial advantage. What's wrong with that? And if at the same time we can stem funding to terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas (which Saddam openly funded), save millions of people from a dictator, and possibly set up a working democracy in the Middle East, why not? To me, that sounds like a major step towards making the world a better and more secure place. I find it laughable that anybody discounts the oil angle, since it's painfully obvious there was no military threat, and ordinarily we don't give two hoots about human rights. Yeah, sure. And the UN does? Quite frankly, the state of 'human rights' in the world would be far better right now if the UN just didn't exist. And for the record, bugging the UN has been going on since day one, by us and pretty much everyone else in the world: http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/ne...un-bugging.htm "If the reaction at the United Nations is more subdued, it may reflect the recognition that wiretapping at the United Nations is as old as the institution itself. "The U.N. has been monitored by bugging or surveillance from day one," said Stephen C. Schlesinger, author of "Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations," an account of the 1945 San Francisco conference that created the body. John E. Pike, director of globalsecurity.org, a nonprofit security policy group in Alexandria, Va., was even blunter. "You could say that there are more spooks in that building than any other on the planet," he said. "Everyone knows that there is a lot of spying and eavesdropping that goes on at the U.N. and during the cold war, it was a hotbed of Soviet espionage," Sergey V. Lavrov, the Russian ambassador, said his country was not a participant. He added, "I think it is illegal, but this shows that the British intelligence service at least technically are very professional." " Evidence of recent bugging activity emerged Friday in BBC interviews with former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and a former Iraq weapons inspector, Richard Butler. Mr. Boutros-Ghali said: "From the first day I entered my office, they told me, `Beware, your office is bugged, your residence is bugged.' It is the tradition that member states that have the technical capacity to bug will do it without hesitation." Mr. Butler said, "There was abundant evidence that we were being constantly monitored." He said that if he had something sensitive to discuss, "I had to go to the basement cafe in the U.N. where there was heaps of noise or I'd go and take a walk in Central Park." According to Mr. Schlesinger, there were three intelligence agencies at work in San Francisco in 1945. "The Army Signal Corps was intercepting all the cable traffic among the diplomats, so we knew in advance the negotiating strategies of practically all the 46 countries coming to San Francisco," he said. "Second was the F.B.I., which was tapping the phones of many of the American visitors and observers at the conference, and there was some belief that they were also tapping the calls of the members of the U.S. delegation itself. " |
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SHOCKING (BBC Radio): UK Minister admits spying on Annan - Katherine Gun released
"Thomas J. Paladino Jr." wrote in message ... That's total bull****. NOBODY at the UN or anywhere else had said that Saddam didn't have WMD's before the war. Everyone believed that he had them, and everyone was wrong. Period. We now know that at least the British intelligence services never really believed that Saddam in 2002-2003 had any operational WMD... Dossiers like the "September Dossier" or the "Dodgy Dossier" and General Powell's "Presentation to the UN Security Council" were largely forged and manipulated propaganda stunts. We know indeed that the French President, who was promoting the continuation of the peaceful disarmement and containment which had worked until the US invasion, had said that "There was an inspections regime which destroyed more weapons in Iraq than were destroyed throughout the Gulf War and which, in particular, resulted in the complete, almost complete eradication in all likelihood - at any rate according to what the inspectors say - of Iraq's nuclear programme... There are some [weapons] certainly. Missiles with a longer than permitted range are being destroyed. There are probably other weapons." (http://www.elysee.fr/ang/actus/iraq/march10.htm and http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe...rac/index.html), but Germany's foreign minister let it be known that (""My generation learned you must make a case, and excuse me, I am not convinced. That is my problem, I cannot go to the public and say, 'these are the reasons', because I don't believe in them." (Joschka Fischer speaking to Donald Rumsfeld at the Munich Sicherheitskonferenz, 08 February 2003). And for sure Syria, which was also on the UN Security Council, did not buy into the story. Not to mention Richard Butler, Scott Ritter, David Kelly and other former UN weapons inspectors... Now here is what happened: .. After the second Gulf War in 1991, the UN ordered Iraq to disarm and to allow inspectors in to oversee this process. ("the inspections regime") .. In 1998 the Iraqi government threw the inspectors out, in protest against the illegal no-fly zones that were imposed by the US and the UK over Iraqi territory, and in protest against the presence of secret agents and other intelligence officers that were members of the so-called 'independent' UN inspection teams - both claims we now know, were absolutely justified. .. After letting the inspectors back in, Iraq kept on protesting against, disobeying or ignoring some of the (minor) instructions and requests of the UN inspectors. However: most of the demands, such as disarmement and dismantlement of the WMD, were met, which is why both Blix and El Barradei at the beginning of 2003 could not point to any existence of WMD or WMD programs. At the same time however, they could not be 100% sure that all the weapons and weapons programs had been destroyed, given the lack of time originally given to them by the UNSC, which is exactly why they asked for more time. Saddam did not kick Blix and his team of UN inspectors out of the country: the US forced them to leave on the eve of the illegal (no second resolution, remember?) invasion - so in fact Bush and Blair made the inspectors leave the country, despite Bush's repeated claims to the contrary. In the meantime, Iraq kept on disarming as it continued to undergo the illegal no-fly bombings of both its military and civilian infrastructure. .. Launching an un-UN-sanctioned war hence caused serious international and domestic legal problems, especially for Tony Blair and his defence secretary Geoff Hoon. We now know that Blair never bothered (or dared?) to inform about the real nature of Saddam's WMD, depsite personally writing the foreword to some of the dossiers that were presented to Parliament and to the UK public opinion. (on this issue, once again I refer to GEOFF HOON's, Britain's Defence Minister, interview with BBC Radio on 5 February 2004: http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today/audio/geoffhoon.ram and the ensuing clarification and exposure of the lies: http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today/li...n_20040205.ram ). We know now that the information that was provided to us by both the UK and US governments was false. The intelligence that was provided to those same governments - but not to us - however wasn't: most analysts agreed that their was no imminent threat, that there were almost certainly no deployable WMD and that there were no operational ballistic or other strategic weapons to effectively deliver any such WMD. At the same time, the IntelS could not tell for sure what happened to the original 1991 stocks of WMD (which by 2003 would have expired anyway), while they weren't 100% sure about the status of Iraq's "WMD programs". In other words, there was no imminent threat and there were no WMD - which is why Chirac told the international press that France would not back a further UNSC resolution until any such imminent WMD threat was reported on by the UN inspectors or until it was clear that Saddam would not allow the UN inspectors to do their work (disarming the country). Chirac never said that he would "NEVER" back a second UN resolution, which it appears to be was Tony Blairs (flawed) ratio decidendi in his casus belli... Of course everyone knew that Saddam was a dangerous man, with the apparent ambition to develop WMD programs - which is why the 15 member countries of the UNSC voted Resolution 1441. That is not to say however, as you put it, that "NOBODY at the UN or anywhere else had said that Saddam didn't have WMD's before the war" or that "everyone believed that he had them,and everyone was wrong"... And even if that were the case, which it was clearly not, then this pre-emptive war is still illegal. Iraq could have been disarmed and monitored with other, peaceful means. Despite all the bugging and diplomatic pressure, there simply (still) is no second UN resolution to approve the invision. No WMD have been found, precisely as was predicted by the (UK's) intelligence services. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- Intelligence chief's bombshell: 'We were overruled on dossier' The Independent, London - 04 February 2004 "The intelligence official whose revelations stunned the Hutton inquiry has suggested that not a single defence intelligence expert backed Tony Blair's most contentious claims on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction." http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/pol...p?story=487557 --- We were overruled, says former intelligence chief, and the result was a dossier that was misleading about Iraqi WMD Brian Jones: 'There was a lack of substantive evidence... We were told there was intelligence we could not see' In his statement to the Commons on the Hutton report last week, Tony Blair declared that "we can have a debate about the war, about WMD and about intelligence". Yesterday, he made clear an independent investigation would finally go ahead. In the Commons and in his evidence to MPs yesterday, the Prime Minister referred to my own concerns about the Government's assessment of the Iraqi threat. Now that the Hutton report has been published, I feel able to speak on what is in the public domain and on the issues that I believe should be examined by any investigation into "intelligence failure". It is clear from the evidence to the Hutton inquiry that the experts of the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) who dealt with chemical and biological warfare, including those working directly with me, had problems with some aspects of what was being said in various drafts of the dossier that was published on 24 September 2002. The problem was that the best available current evidence that Saddam actually had chemical and biological weapons (CW and BW) was the inference that this must be so from the claim of an apparently unproven original source that such weapons could be "deployed" within 45 minutes. Although the information was relayed through a reliable second source, there was no indication the original or primary source had established a track record of reliability. Furthermore, the information reported by the source was vague in all aspects except, possibly, for the range of times quoted. I believe the DIS experts who worked for and with me were the foremost group of analysts in the West on nuclear, biological and chemical warfare intelligence. It is their job to consider all other related evidence. What was missing was, for example, strong evidence of the continuing existence of weapons and agents and substantive evidence on production or storage. There was no indication that the Iraqi military had practiced the use of CW or BW weapons for more than a decade. But it was known that Iraq had previously possessed CW and BW capabilities and used chemical weapons. Further, Saddam had failed to satisfy the UN that the capability had been eliminated. On balance the DIS experts felt it should be recorded that a CW or BW capability at some level was a probability, but argued against its statement in stronger terms. Despite pointing this out in comments on several drafts, the stronger statements did eventually appear in the executive summary, the part of the dossier "owned" by the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Without such a strong summary, the translation of a probability into a certainty that occurred in the foreword drafted by Alastair Campbell, the Prime Minister's former director of communications, would have been more noticeable. My recollection is that the disagreement of the experts in the DIS was not so much resolved as finessed. My belief is that right up to the publication of the dossier there was a unified view amongst not only my own staff but all the DIS experts that on the basis of the intelligence available to them the assessment that Iraq possessed a CW or BW capability should be carefully caveated. But we were told there was other intelligence that we, the experts, could not see, and that it removed the reservations we were expressing. It was so sensitive it could not be shown to us. It was held within a tight virtual "compartment", available only to a few selected people. The two DIS representatives on the dossier-drafting group were told at the last drafting meeting on 17 September that the compartmented intelligence would be shown by the SIS (MI6) to only the two most senior members of the DIS, the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) and his deputy (DCDI). At a subsequent DIS meeting on that day, the DCDI ruled that he was satisfied by the SIS reassurance and that no further objections on the contentious issues should be raised with the Cabinet Office Assessment Staff. It transpired from evidence to the Hutton inquiry that the clinching intelligence was never seen by the DCDI. By the time I returned from leave on 18 September to a very disgruntled team the deadline for production of the dossier was fast approaching. I examined the relevant reports and discussed them with my experts and decided they were right to be concerned. My experience of the intelligence process made me suspicious of what was happening. I was not reassured when my boss said he had been assured by a representative of the SIS that the new sensitive material was reliable and negated our concerns. My boss was brand new to the intelligence business, unfamiliar with the assessment process and not in the compartment. I considered who might have seen this ultra-sensitive intelligence and reached the conclusion that it was extremely doubtful that anyone with a high degree of CW and BW intelligence expertise was among the exclusive group. It was becoming clear that it was very unlikely we could achieve the balance we desired in the dossier and it was important to register our misgivings formally. Earlier in my intelligence career, I and others in my branch had not taken similar precautions and suffered for it. We believed that no large stockpiles of chemical weapons, such as those present in 1990/91, existed because if they did they would probably have been detected by intelligence. The smaller quantities of chemical weapons that might exist would be hard to find, as would small but significant amounts of BW agents and delivery systems. I foresaw that after the likely invasion and defeat of Iraq, it was quite possible that no WMD would be found. If this happened scapegoats would be sought, so I decided that we should record our concerns about the dossier in order to protect our reputation. But this is a big step to take and I wanted to be as sure of my ground as possible. The UK intelligence community is not large and you can usually find your way to someone "in the know." They need not stray beyond the limits of what they are allowed to reveal, but they can still be of assistance. I eventually found someone who was in the relevant compartment. Information was not volunteered and I did not ask about the detailed content of these reports. I explained the reservations that we had about the draft dossier and asked whether the compartmented intelligence resolved any of these concerns. I was advised they did not. A draft of the dossier arrived on the 19 September. We were told this was the "final" version for proof-reading and no substantive comment would be considered. In any case the DCDI had ruled that no further objections should be made. I arranged the short meeting with David Kelly and others that I have described in testimony to Lord Hutton to satisfy myself that the basis of Dr Kelly's view that the dossier was "good" did not contradict our own position. By the end of the day I was confident of my ground and I sent a memorandum to my director and copied it to the DCDI, who, as a member of the JIC, could still intervene if he chose to do so. Once my initial memo was in, my deputy, who was also the CW expert in my branch, was able to contribute a more detailed and direct explanation of our concerns in the light of yet another "final" draft that had appeared. Neither memo produced a direct response. We could only suppose that the compartmented intelligence seen by the CDI was clear and unambiguous for him to disregard, without discussion, the recorded views of two senior analysts who, although only of middle rank were, like the late Dr Kelly, the UK's foremost experts in their field. During the course of their own inquiry, the Intelligence and Security Committee was given sight of the relevant intelligence and, despite the fact that they are not expert intelligence analysts, they reported rather enigmatically that they could "understand the basis on which the CDI and the JIC took the view they did". But with all that has and has not happened since, I believe the advice I received in September 2002 about the compartmented intelligence was valid. Now that it is being so widely suggested that Britain went to war on the back of an "intelligence failure", it is important that the nature of that failure is understood. An intelligence failure can be the result of many things. The absence of significant "raw" intelligence would be a collection failure. There was a self-inflicted dearth of information on Iraq following the withdrawal of Unscom inspectors before Operation Desert Fox in 1998 and an additional degree of uncertainty once their constraining influence was lost. A failure can result if the significance of a piece of "raw" intelligence is not recognised, or its analysis is flawed, or its context misunderstood. This would be an assessment failure. The failure of policy-makers to accept or act on information can also be called an intelligence failure because of the inadequacy of its presentation by the intelligence community. Whether or not there was a failure of intelligence assessment should be judged, not on the dossier, but on relevant JIC papers. Similarly, whether or not there was a failure in intelligence collection should be judged on the reports the collectors issued. Arguably, the dossier revealed more about the top end of the process and the fashioning of a product that has hitherto been alien to the UK intelligence community. In my view the expert intelligence analysts of the DIS were overruled in the preparation of the dossier in September 2002 resulting in a presentation that was misleading about Iraq's capabilities. It would be a travesty if the reputation of the DIS and its dedicated people was besmirched and the organisation as a whole undermined. The DIS includes the only significant body of dedicated professional intelligence analysts in the UK intelligence community and they are a much under-valued and under-resourced national asset. It is the intelligence community leadership at the level of the membership of the JIC and the upper echelons of the DIS - those who had access to and may have misinterpreted the compartmented intelligence - that had the final say on the assessment presented in the dossier. Lord Hutton describes the JIC as, "the most senior body in the Intelligence Services charged with the assessment of intelligence". But this is misleading. The members of the JIC are mostly extremely busy officials. Some are effectively the chief executives of large organisations with large budgets and all that goes with that responsibility. Others have a wide range of other responsibilities. All will have a limited time to study personally intelligence reports and the related archives in detail. Most will have had quite limited experience of analysing intelligence. From my perspective the JIC's function is to oversee the assessment of intelligence and question and challenge the experienced and dedicated analysts and intelligence collectors on issues where they, the JIC, might understand the broader relevance and significance of a particular assessment. When they take it upon themselves to overrule experienced experts they should be very sure of their ground, and if a decision to do so is based on additional sensitive intelligence unknown to the experts, it must be incontrovertible. Events have shown that we in the DIS were right to urge caution. I suggest that now might be a good time to open the box and release from its compartment the intelligence that played such a significant part in formulating a key part of the dossier. I recognise this could possibly be one of a few exceptional circumstances that means the content of the compartmented intelligence remains sensitive even after the fall of Saddam. If this is the case it should be clearly stated. Otherwise the simple act of opening this box and explaining who had the right to look into it before the war could increase the transparency and hasten the progress of the new inquiry. Dr Brian Jones was formerly head of the branch within the Scientific and Technical Directorate of Defence Intelligence Staff that was responsible for the analysis of intelligence from all sources on nuclear, biological and chemical warfare. He retired in January 2003 The Independent, London - 04 February 2004 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- Here is an article by Richard Tomlinson, another 'intelligence whistle blower', who was also jailed after trying to release a book on his work at MI6: Who was that at the shredder? The joint intelligence committee chairman, John Scarlett, was well-placed to cherry-pick intelligence Richard Tomlinson The Guardian, Monday February 9, 2004 The Butler inquiry will irritate the secret intelligence service, the Foreign Office and the defence intelligence service, none of which will welcome such unprecedented delving into their procedures and integrity. But I am confident that Lord Butler's report will exonerate all three principal players in the intelligence bureaucracy. John Scarlett, the joint intelligence committee chairman, may, however, be sleeping less easily. I worked in SIS's operational counter-proliferation department from 1993 until 1995. My principal targets were Iran and Libya, and my objectives were to penetrate, disrupt and gather intelligence on the operations by those two countries to obtain chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. I did not work directly on operations against Iraq, but I shared an office with those who did and was privy to SIS operations against Iraq, and the intelligence we were gaining from them. I will not divulge details of the operations that we undertook. But I will make two observations. First, I was struck by how poorly sighted we were in the mid-90s on the countries in our sights. We had few well-placed and reliable sources in Iraq, Libya or Iran. Second, the balance of our intelligence suggested that Iraq was in disarray after the first Gulf war and the imposition of UN sanctions, and did not have active programmes to develop biological and nuclear weapons. Iraq could have changed course radically after I left SIS, but this is unlikely. In the mid-90s, there were not only no significant stocks of WMD, there was no volition to replace them. My conviction is that the balance of SIS's intelligence prior to the invasion last year indicated that Iraq did not have strategically significant WMD - just as Hans Blix argued before the invasion and David Kay has confirmed in the aftermath. So how can it be that the picture presented by the prime minister to parliament and to the British public was so radically different? The only plausible explanation is that intelligence was "cherry-picked" and that spin further exaggerated the threat. It would be illegal for Iraq to possess any form of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, and the belated discovery of even a trace of activity would let the prime minister off the hook on a technicality. But the war could only be justified if we find evidence of strategically significant WMD. This would require that Iraq had developed a deployable nuclear warhead - but we know it did not have the technology to do this. Chemical weapons were within Iraq's capability, and we may yet find small stocks in Iraq. But chemical weapons are tactical battlefield weapons - and poor ones at that. Illegal, yes. Nasty, yes. But WMD? No. SIS intelligence never provides exact judgments. Rather, it passes its various reports, along with an assessment of the motivation, access and reliability of each source, to the analysts in the DIS and FCO, who would judge the overall picture. If intelligence reports from reliable, well-placed sources saying that Iraq had no strategically important biological or nuclear weapons were slipped into the shredder, while reports from unreliable, financially motivated sources saying that Iraq still had a few shells loaded with mustard gas were slipped into the dossier, then it would be possible on a technicality for the prime minister to stand up before parliament and honestly say that he had intelligence that Iraq possessed WMD. But who was busy with the shredder? It is inconceivable that SIS itself would have cherry-picked its intelligence. Supplying false intelligence is a "hanging crime" in the SIS, and there is a very strong corporate culture against it. Manipulating intelligence does occasionally happen in SIS, but it is impossible to imagine how it could be systematic enough to mislead government. For similar reasons, I am sure that the principal customers of intelligence - the DIS and the FCO - would never have distorted their analysis of the raw intelligence. Dr Brian Jones has convincingly defended the DIS and I think the Butler inquiry will concur. So who does that leave? The finger of suspicion points to the JIC, and in particular to one man, its chairman, John Scarlett. Scarlett was the first JIC chairman from the "production" side of the intelligence apparatus. This put the cart before the horse: the JIC chairman was too close to SIS, and this may have led to a bypassing of the tried-and-trusted methods by which intelligence is impartially analysed. Normally, the JIC chairman would never see dubious or minor intelligence reports. But given the close working relationship between Scarlett and the SIS chief, Sir Richard Dearlove, and Scarlett's knowledge of the workings of SIS, he could have had an unusually intimate knowledge of the raw intelligence. He certainly could have cherry-picked intelligence. But why would he have done so? Dearlove is due to retire in August, and Scarlett undoubtedly had his eye on the job. Scarlett's relationship with Alastair Campbell is "matey", and the influence that Campbell held with the prime minister is well documented. Here is a potential mechanism worthy of investigation by the Butler inquiry, by which the prime minister's desire to find intelligence to support a war has subverted the usual safeguards built into the Whitehall system. As a result, more than 50 British soldiers, 500 other coalition soldiers and 15,000 Iraqis are dead, and all three counts are still rising. We deserve some credible answers. · Richard Tomlinson worked for MI6 from 1991 to 1995. He was jailed under the Official Secrets Act for attempting to publish his memoirs ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- 'Blair could go to prison' - Katharine Gun case aftermath The debate on the legality of the Iraq war has been reignited Monday March 1, 2004 The Guardian Observer Editorial, February 29 "The dramatic collapse of the case brought under the Official Secrets Act against Katharine Gun, the GCHQ translator, raises concerns ... A trial, though personally harrowing, would have flushed out more crucial detail about the circumstances surrounding the Iraq war. In order to press home the 'necessity' case, Mrs Gun's lawyers would have forced the government to release [the attorney general] Lord Goldsmith's advice to the prime minister about the legality of the Iraq war in the absence of a second, supportive UN resolution. "We now know, following a statement last week from Elizabeth Wilmshurst, the former deputy legal adviser at the foreign office who resigned on the eve of war, that the legal team believed that the war was illegal. Her statement adds weight to the growing evidence that the government may have been advised that it was launching an illegal war and that the attorney general was reluctant to continue with the prosecution of Mrs Gun because a trial would have revealed evidence of this advice." Sunday Times Editorial, February 29 "The dropping of charges ... against Mrs Gun ... has, partly thanks to Clare Short, opened up a new front against the prime minister. The former international development secretary [alleged] the attorney general, Lord Goldsmith, was manipulated or 'leant upon' to produce an opinion justifying the legality of the war ... "Tony Blair was in good company in getting it wrong over weapons of mass destruction. He made a more serious misjudgment in believing until the 11th hour there would be a second UN resolution authorising war. With that, questions about the war's legality would have evaporated. Without it, the mood in Whitehall was something like panic, a scramble to provide legal justification for joining the United States in invading Iraq ... "[Mr Blair's] weakness is that he tries to be all things to all men. The war was one of the tough choices he keeps telling us about. One day he will have to tell his critics, particularly in his own party, to stop carping and accept that reality." Peter Carter Independent on Sunday, February 29 "The justification - and the only justification - relied upon was the persistent breach of UN security council resolutions on disarmament ... Iraq made life difficult for [the] inspectors so that various other security council resolutions followed, ending in resolution 1441, adopted on November 8 2002. This gave Iraq what it termed a 'final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations' and threatened 'serious consequences' should it fail to do so. As a justification for war, the US and the UK argued that Iraq was in breach of resolution 1441 ... [which] concluded by saying that the security council is to 'remain seized of this matter' ... "In international law, states are not allowed to be vigilantes claiming to act on behalf of the security council. Such claims are spurious. The result is that any acts taken without security council authorisation are unlawful, unless justified as self-defence ... The invasion was unlawful." · Peter Carter QC is chair of the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales Sunday Telegraph Editorial, February 29 "The most striking thing about this debate is its pointlessness. The 'legality' or otherwise of the war is a non-subject, for the simple reason that there is no binding body of inter-national law which compels obedience, either in morality or in fact, from the sovereign nations of the globe ... "'International law', in so far as it ventures beyond the law of the sea, is almost entirely bogus. The 'principles of international law', allegedly held in such reverence by their advocates, have never been mandated by the peoples of the nations to whom they are meant to apply ... "The point ... is that the whole issue of 'international legality' is a gigantic irrelevance. The only thing that counts in a democracy ... is whether the people who elected the government support the war which their government has declared. If a solid majority of the British people can be persuaded that the Iraq war was right and just, then Mr Blair's problems with it will be at an end. If they cannot be so persuaded, he will pay a price at the next general election." John Laughland Mail on Sunday, February 29 "If it turns out that the Iraq war was illegal, then Mr Blair could go to prison. In 2000, the United Kingdom ratified the Rome Treaty which created the international criminal court. In the run-up to the conflict, therefore, the government was well aware that an illegal war could spark a prosecution against senior ministers ... The case against the British government over Iraq is strong ... There was no United Nations authorisation for the attack - whatever Mr Blair and Geoff Hoon [the defence secretary] try to claim now, resolution 1441 was not a mandate for war - and there was no claim that a war was necessary to combat an alleged humanitarian crisis, as in Kosovo ... "Opponents of the war would take pleasure in seeing Mr Blair walk into a trap of his own making ... If our attorney general failed to act, some would be delighted at the thought of foreign judges indicting Mr Blair. But that would be a terrible day for British democracy." |
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SHOCKING (BBC Radio): UK Minister admits spying on Annan - Katherine Gun released
"Simon Robbins" wrote in message ... It's not about comandeering the industry, but about ensuring it's kept in friendly hands that are more willing to do business our way to our financial advantage. I find it laughable that anybody discounts the oil angle, since it's painfully obvious there was no military threat, and ordinarily we don't give two hoots about human rights. So sad that it's true. Jim D Si |
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