NY TIMES: The Humble Valujet No More

James Robinson wrote:

"Frank F. Matthews" wrote:

beavis wrote:


James Robinson wrote:



... they were the first airline to
extensively contract out maintenance. Something done in many other
industries, I might add. There was an accident, which arguably
wasn't the fault of the airline management, and were then considered
as "unsafe".

Please. They contracted things out to SabreTech because they were
CHEAPER, simple as that. Their subcontractor cut corners, and 110
people died as a result. ValuJet wasn't DIRECTLY responsible, no,
but they were most certainly at fault for using a shady contractor.

Further, the cabin-to-cockpit interphone had been deferred, meaning
the cabin crew had no way to communicate the fire to the flight crew
other than yelling through the cockpit door.

So yes, Valujet shared a great deal of responsibility for the crash.

They shipped dangerous cargo without proper care.


ValuJet did not knowingly ship dangerous cargo. Their policy was to not
handle dangerous items. The package was not labeled by SabreTech as
dangerous, so the airline did not know what they were handling.


I would give them some slack except for the fact that Sabretrch was a
major contractor of theirs. I do not give management a pass on quality
control simply because they decide to contract out part of the business.
They can outsource the business but not the responsibility for how it
is conducted.

James Robinson wrote:
Yes, to the final buyer, but they will pass on any claims to Firestone,
who ultimately is responsible.

That is somewhat debatable.

In the example of Ford and Firestone, Ford choose those tires, evaluated
their performance and decided to use those tires to build some models of
its products. It is no different that Ford choosing a certain model of
exhaust, fuel injection, brakes, or shock absorbers and integrating it
into its car. So Ford is ultimately responsible for having chosen a
type of tire that turned out to be unsafe. This indicates poor quality
assurance and testing procedures by Ford on a "outsourced" tire manufacturer.

If Firestore delivered tires that were different from those shown to
Ford during evaluations, (lesser quality, allowing imperfect tires to be
shipped etc), then Ford would definitely have a beef.

Of course, in the end, Ford can sue Firestone, but in such a suit, Ford
would have to admit some responsability because it tested/evaluated the
tires and found them to be satisfactory.

In the case of Valuejet, Valuejet chose a contractor but did not take
steps to ensure that this contractor would apply 100% of the rules 100%
of the time.

The crash was a very unfortunate accident due to a mistake in labeling.
Someone affixed "discharged" on a package without ensuring they were in
fact discharged, and there were no procedures to ensure this was double
checked.

James Robinson wrote:
The airlines all have a pervasive culture of safety. They know that all
it takes is one mistake, one incident, to cause a bad accident, and
destroy any credibility they might have had as a carrier. The loss of
credibility causes loss of patronage, which would cost them far more
than the cost of the accident itself.

Viewed at the corporate level, this is true. But in a localised level,
there are lapses due to pressures of the worplace. A low cost carrier
has fewer spare planes. So on order to keep dispatch levels high enough,
some staff may feel some pressure to overlook some "minor" glitches to
get the plane off the ground (and out of their jurisdiction) and let
some other station/airport handle the problem (and that other airport is
then stuck with the delays).

"overlook some "minor" glitches" is often a question of judgement. Pilot
reports some problems with gizmo X, but when it is tested on the ground,
Gizmo Z seems to work perfectly. So they let the plane go. Or that
station may not have the necessary spare part and they decide it is best
to just send the plan onto the next airport which has the spare part.
Waiting for that spare part to be flown in would take too long and
inconvenience too many passengers.


Consider the famous case of the Gimli glider: large airline with good
"corporate safety" culture, but local pressures to dispatch that brand
new plane on time lead them to allow it to take off with inoperative
fuel gauges (permitted at the time, but still unsafe) despite this being
the first time that the airline and ground personnel had fueled any
plane with metric measures.

The danger of low cost carriers (in the pejorative sense of the
expression) is that employees are working at full capacity, so during a
bad day, a employee may not have the time to perform the normal due
diligence on everything, and so some errors may go unnoticed.


If you have a civil service organisation (aka: legacy carriers), then
there is plenty of surplus staff, so during a bad day, there is more
spare manpower available to handle the additional tasks while
maintaining the same high standards of due diligence on all the rules.

nobody wrote:

James Robinson wrote:

Yes, to the final buyer, but they will pass on any claims to
Firestone, who ultimately is responsible.

That is somewhat debatable.

It's not debatable at all. Firestone had defective tires. They will have
taken the major hit for any claims. Ford may have had some culpability,
but they would not have paid the most in claims, unless they paritally
indemnified Firestone, or had a problem with the design of their vehicles.

nobody wrote:

James Robinson wrote:

The airlines all have a pervasive culture of safety. They know that
all it takes is one mistake, one incident, to cause a bad accident,
and destroy any credibility they might have had as a carrier. The
loss of credibility causes loss of patronage, which would cost them
far more than the cost of the accident itself.

Viewed at the corporate level, this is true. But in a localised level,
there are lapses due to pressures of the worplace. A low cost carrier
has fewer spare planes. So on order to keep dispatch levels high
enough, some staff may feel some pressure to overlook some "minor"
glitches to get the plane off the ground (and out of their
jurisdiction) and let some other station/airport handle the problem
(and that other airport is then stuck with the delays).

I don't think you will find that at all. Every mechanic knows the
importance of their job. Southwest is a good example of a low cost
carrier. Do you really think they have that attitude? Not likely.

"overlook some "minor" glitches" is often a question of judgement.
Pilot reports some problems with gizmo X, but when it is tested on the
ground, Gizmo Z seems to work perfectly. So they let the plane go. Or
that station may not have the necessary spare part and they decide it
is best to just send the plan onto the next airport which has the
spare part. Waiting for that spare part to be flown in would take too
long and inconvenience too many passengers.

All airlines let aircraft fly with unrepaired items. They simply can't
stock all the parts nor have the expertise at every airport. That is
what Minimum Equipment Lists are all about. They detail what items can
be passed to the next location for repair. It is a black and white
decision.

Consider the famous case of the Gimli glider: large airline with good
"corporate safety" culture, but local pressures to dispatch that brand
new plane on time lead them to allow it to take off with inoperative
fuel gauges (permitted at the time, but still unsafe) despite this
being the first time that the airline and ground personnel had fueled
any plane with metric measures.

That is not what happened. The electrician in Edmonton attempted to fix
one of the two fuel gauges, which had failed, but did not have the
proper parts. The second gauge was still working. The MEL allowed the
aircraft to continue in service, as long as the amount of fuel displayed
on the gauge was verified by manual measurement suing the tapes. That
was done.

On arrival in Montreal, another electrician attempted to repair the
failed gauge, but was unable to. In the process of troubleshooting the
problem, he inadvertently disabled the second gauge, leaving the
aircraft with no working gauges. Had this been known, the aircraft would
have been grounded, since it did not meet the MEL.

At this point there was miscommunication. The maintenance supervisor
thought that the aircraft was in the same condition as when it arrived,
and therefore approved its departure. The captain didn't have an MEL of
his own, so he took the instruction from the maintenance supervisor, and
had the tanks manually measured, thinking this was all that was
necessary. The crew making the manual measurement made a mistake, which
actually was the second one in the chain of errors that resulted in the
aircraft running out of fuel.

Had the maintenance supervisor known about the completely failed gauges,
the aircraft would have been grounded. There was no pressure to turn
the aircraft and get it into the air, it was simply a series of
mistakes.

The danger of low cost carriers (in the pejorative sense of the
expression) is that employees are working at full capacity, so during
a bad day, a employee may not have the time to perform the normal due
diligence on everything, and so some errors may go unnoticed.

If you have a civil service organisation (aka: legacy carriers), then
there is plenty of surplus staff, so during a bad day, there is more
spare manpower available to handle the additional tasks while
maintaining the same high standards of due diligence on all the rules.

Sorry, you are speculating in the worst way. That is no better than the
speculation that the media makes when they try to connect low cost -
unsafe.

nobody wrote:

James Robinson wrote:

I don't think you will find that at all. Every mechanic knows the
importance of their job. Southwest is a good example of a low cost
carrier. Do you really think they have that attitude? Not likely.

Southwest is not a "low cost carrier". It is an efficient , serious ,
no frills carrier whose fares are lower.
Southwest is also an old carrier, established, well funded and
slow/progressive growth.

Southwest is the classic low cost carrier. There is no denying it.
Just because they have been successful, doesn't mean they don't wear
that label. No food, no interlining, fast turnarounds, basic aircraft
with no first class, no assigned seating, etc, etc.

Valujet was quite different. Newbie airline, hungry for any growth,
extremely agressive and truly seeking the lowest possible costs and
was ecouraged by huge support from wall street casino analysts who
wanted to make money by boosting the ratings of Valujet.

Valujet was only different in that they were trying to look at other
ways to save money. They were one of the first to extensively outsource
work. They were targeted by unions and the media for breaking from the
methods of other carriers. Safety is always something that people focus
on with low cost carriers, implying that somehow they can't be as safe.
What about the legacy carriers that have collectively lost over $20
billion in the last few years? Surely they must be looking at their
maintenance budgets the same way as the so-called budget airlines?

All airlines let aircraft fly with unrepaired items. They simply
can't stock all the parts nor have the expertise at every airport.
That is what Minimum Equipment Lists are all about.

MELs may be black and white. But if a gizmo reported by pilot to be
erratic while in flight appears to work properly on the ground, then
this leaves room for some interpretation.

And recently, there was a small regional airline in BC that was
grounded after a crash and reports from pilots that they were often
pressured to fly with aircraft having known defects. They were
pressured to opered with some MEL items inoperative.

None of the Valujet incidents were caused by intermittent problems that
had been unattended. You are trying to hang them for things that simply
didn't happen.

That is not what happened. The electrician in Edmonton attempted to
fix one of the two fuel gauges, which had failed, but did not have
the proper parts.

The point was that there was pressure inherent for this flight to get
it out on time. Nobody decided to put pressure on the crews, it was
just "ambiant" pressure due to circumstances of that flight.

There is always pressure to get aircraft flying again. That is the
reality of any scheduled passenger operation, whether it be a legacy
carrier, a charter, or a low-cost operator. There is nothing different
between them in that regard.

necessary. The crew making the manual measurement made a mistake,
which actually was the second one in the chain of errors that
resulted in the aircraft running out of fuel.

You forget the fact that the refuelers didn't put enough fuel in the
aircraft to begin with. That mistake SHOULD have been caught by the
manual tank checks, but it wasn't.

I'm not forgetting that at all. The MEL would have grounded the
aircraft, if the extent of the fuel gauge failures had been known to the
maintenance supervisor. The requirement for at least two separate checks
of fuel level is basic to the concept, and specifically aimed at
eliminating the mistake that was made. The incident was not a result of
pressure to get the aircraft flying again, it was because of simple
miscommunication.

James Robinson wrote:
nobody wrote:

James Robinson wrote:

I don't think you will find that at all. Every mechanic knows the
importance of their job. Southwest is a good example of a low cost
carrier. Do you really think they have that attitude? Not likely.

Southwest is not a "low cost carrier". It is an efficient , serious ,
no frills carrier whose fares are lower.
Southwest is also an old carrier, established, well funded and
slow/progressive growth.


Southwest is the classic low cost carrier. There is no denying it.
Just because they have been successful, doesn't mean they don't wear
that label. No food, no interlining, fast turnarounds, basic aircraft
with no first class, no assigned seating, etc, etc.


Valujet was quite different. Newbie airline, hungry for any growth,
extremely agressive and truly seeking the lowest possible costs and
was ecouraged by huge support from wall street casino analysts who
wanted to make money by boosting the ratings of Valujet.


Valujet was only different in that they were trying to look at other
ways to save money. They were one of the first to extensively outsource
work. They were targeted by unions and the media for breaking from the
methods of other carriers. Safety is always something that people focus
on with low cost carriers, implying that somehow they can't be as safe.
What about the legacy carriers that have collectively lost over $20
billion in the last few years? Surely they must be looking at their
maintenance budgets the same way as the so-called budget airlines?


All airlines let aircraft fly with unrepaired items. They simply
can't stock all the parts nor have the expertise at every airport.
That is what Minimum Equipment Lists are all about.

MELs may be black and white. But if a gizmo reported by pilot to be
erratic while in flight appears to work properly on the ground, then
this leaves room for some interpretation.

And recently, there was a small regional airline in BC that was
grounded after a crash and reports from pilots that they were often
pressured to fly with aircraft having known defects. They were
pressured to opered with some MEL items inoperative.


None of the Valujet incidents were caused by intermittent problems that
had been unattended. You are trying to hang them for things that simply
didn't happen.


That is not what happened. The electrician in Edmonton attempted to
fix one of the two fuel gauges, which had failed, but did not have
the proper parts.

The point was that there was pressure inherent for this flight to get
it out on time. Nobody decided to put pressure on the crews, it was
just "ambiant" pressure due to circumstances of that flight.


There is always pressure to get aircraft flying again. That is the
reality of any scheduled passenger operation, whether it be a legacy
carrier, a charter, or a low-cost operator. There is nothing different
between them in that regard.


necessary. The crew making the manual measurement made a mistake,
which actually was the second one in the chain of errors that
resulted in the aircraft running out of fuel.

You forget the fact that the refuelers didn't put enough fuel in the
aircraft to begin with. That mistake SHOULD have been caught by the
manual tank checks, but it wasn't.


I'm not forgetting that at all. The MEL would have grounded the
aircraft, if the extent of the fuel gauge failures had been known to the
maintenance supervisor. The requirement for at least two separate checks
of fuel level is basic to the concept, and specifically aimed at
eliminating the mistake that was made. The incident was not a result of
pressure to get the aircraft flying again, it was because of simple
miscommunication.

We are getting distracted with the 'low cost' issue. The point is that
some managements have become driven by financial considerations to the
point that safety concerns are generated. This can certainly be related
to cost concerns but can be a factor in legacy carriers as well, In
fact if you look at the record inept management making safety decisions
for schedule reasons was the primary reason that NASA lost the Challenger.