Fired Boeing Engineer Calls 787's Plastic Fuselage Unsafe

Lots of points to talk about in here. Discuss.
But this guy going to Dan Rather with his complaints -- well, that kinda
destroys any credibility he might have.


Fired engineer calls 787's plastic fuselage unsafe

By Dominic Gates
Seattle Times aerospace reporter
Tuesday, September 18, 2007 - 12:00 AM

A former senior aerospace engineer at Boeing's Phantom Works research
unit, fired last year under disputed circumstances, is going public with
concerns that the new 787 Dreamliner is unsafe.

Forty-six-year veteran Vince Weldon contends that in a crash landing
that would be survivable in a metal airplane, the new jet's innovative
composite plastic materials will shatter too easily and burn with toxic
fumes. He backs up his views with e-mails from engineering colleagues at
Boeing and claims the company isn't doing enough to test the plane's
crashworthiness.

Boeing vigorously denies Weldon's assertions, saying the questions he
raised internally were addressed to the satisfaction of its technical
experts.

Weldon's allegations will be aired tonight by Dan Rather, the former CBS
News anchor, on his weekly investigative show on cable channel HDNet.

Weldon thinks that without years of further research, Boeing shouldn't
build the Dreamliner and that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
shouldn't certify the jet to fly.

Boeing's current compressed schedule calls for a six-month flight-test
program and federal certification in time for delivery in May.

Rather's show presents a letter Weldon wrote to the FAA in July
detailing his view, as well as two e-mails to Weldon dated August 2005
and February 2006, expressing similar safety concerns, from unidentified
senior Boeing engineers who are still at the company.
Weldon worked at a Boeing facility in Kent.

Within Boeing, he led structural design of a complex piece of the space
shuttle and supervised several advance design groups. He has worked with
composites since 1973.

Weldon recently declined through an intermediary to speak with The
Seattle Times.
Boeing confirms he was a senior engineer, but spokeswoman Lori Gunter
said he is not specifically a materials expert.

He complains in his July 24 letter to the FAA that when he expressed his
criticisms internally they were ignored and "well-covered up."

Weldon was fired in July 2006. He alleged in a whistle-blower complaint
with the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) that
the firing was "retaliation for raising concerns throughout the last two
years of his employment about the crashworthiness of the 787."

But according to a summary of OSHA's findings, Boeing told investigators
Weldon was fired for threatening a supervisor, specifically for stating
he wanted to hang the African-American executive "on a meat hook" and
that he "wouldn't mind" seeing a noose around the executive's neck.
Weldon denied to OSHA investigators that he had referred to a noose and
said the "meat hook" reference had not been a threat.

OSHA dismissed Weldon's claim, denying him whistle-blower status largely
on the grounds that Boeing's 787 design does not violate any FAA
regulations or standards.

FAA spokesman Mike Fergus said Monday the 787 will not be certified
unless it meets all the FAA's criteria, including a specific requirement
that Boeing prove passengers will have at least as good a chance of
surviving a crash landing as they would in current metal airliners.
Rather said Weldon had spoken out publicly only with great reluctance.

"We approached Weldon. In the beginning, it was not at all certain he
would cooperate," Rather said in an interview.

Rather said his show doesn't determine whether Boeing or Weldon is
right. But referring to the e-mails from Weldon's peers, he said,
"There are others who are still within the company who are concerned ...
that Boeing could be destroyed by taking the 787 to market too soon and
brushing aside these safety concerns too cavalierly."

The Seattle Times reviewed the program transcript and also the letter to
the FAA. In the letter, Weldon alleges:

• The brittleness of the plastic material from which the 787 fuselage
is built would create a more severe impact shock to passengers than an
aluminum plane, which absorbs impact in a crash by crumpling. A crash
also could shatter the plastic fuselage, creating a hole that would
allow smoke and toxic fumes to fill the passenger cabin.

• After such a crash landing, the composite plastic material burning
in a jet-fuel fire would create "highly toxic smoke and tiny inhalable
carbon slivers" that "would likely seriously incapacitate or kill
passengers."
Weldon also told the FAA this could also pose a major environmental
hazard in the area around the crash site.

• The recently conducted crashworthiness tests — in which Boeing
dropped partial fuselage sections from a height of about 15 feet at a
test site in Mesa, Ariz. — are inadequate and do not match the
stringency of comparable tests done on a 737 fuselage section in 2000.

• The conductive metal mesh embedded in the 787's fuselage surface to
conduct away lightning is too light and vulnerable to hail damage, and
is little better than a "Band-Aid."
Though aluminum airplanes are safe to fly through lightning storms,
Weldon wrote, "I do not have even close to the same level of confidence"
for the 787.

Boeing's Gunter denied the specifics in Weldon's Dreamliner critique.
"We have to demonstrate [to the FAA] comparable crashworthiness to
today's airplanes," she said. "We are doing that."

The recently completed crash tests were successful but are only the
beginning of a process that relies on computer modeling to cover every
possible crash scenario, she said.

Tests so far have shown that shards of composite material released in a
crash are not a shape that is easily inhaled, Gunter said, and the smoke
produced by composites in a jet-fuel fire is no more toxic than the
smoke from the crash of an aluminum plane.

The 787's lightning protection will meet FAA requirements, she said.

Gunter expressed frustration at Weldon's portrayal of the plane maker as
taking shortcuts for profit.

"We wouldn't create a product that isn't safe for the flying public,"
Gunter said. "We fly on those airplanes. Our children fly on those
airplanes."

Dominic Gates: 206-464-2963 or

On Sep 18, 5:57 pm, (thom w) wrote:
Lots of points to talk about in here. Discuss.
But this guy going to Dan Rather with his complaints -- well, that kinda
destroys any credibility he might have.

Not exactly. If you read the article it says:

"Rather said Weldon had spoken out publicly only with great
reluctance.
`We approached Weldon. In the beginning, it was not at all certain he
would cooperate,' Rather said in an interview."

[snip]
Forty-six-year veteran Vince Weldon contends that in a crash landing
that would be survivable in a metal airplane, the new jet's innovative
composite plastic materials will shatter too easily and burn with toxic
fumes. He backs up his views with e-mails from engineering colleagues at
Boeing and claims the company isn't doing enough to test the plane's
crashworthiness.

Boeing vigorously denies Weldon's assertions, saying the questions he
raised internally were addressed to the satisfaction of its technical
experts.
[snip]

Without knowing what all of this is, it is impossible to draw
many
conclusions. It's not that on the surface, or at first blush Weldon
doesn't have some points, but without knowing what is being done
to mitigate the risk, it is hard to tell if he just "lost the
argument"
or is "being ignored". The FAA isn't shy about these things in
general, but then again they aren't completely devoid of political
realities.

My first thought was; how many aircraft of this size have an
accident in which the primary threat is the fire and fumes?
Not that it is impossible or anything, but if one did an historical
study, limiting it to aircraft of this size, how many, if any,
would these concerns have been functionally determinant in
the outcome?

In my own work I've never had a particular requirement
for the subsequent fire. There are "crash conditions"
for which the equipment is not to threaten the occupants,
but I've never seen fire as one of them. Of course,
one could make the case that this is an oversight,
born of relative insensitivity of metals to the fire.

me wrote:

My first thought was; how many aircraft of this size have an
accident in which the primary threat is the fire and fumes?

Most.

The Singapore 747 at taipei that took off from a runway under
contruction, hit a truck/barricade and then caughgt fire. Fire was the
biggest problem during evacuation of aircraft.

Recently, the Air France 340 at Toronto that overshot runway and ended
up in the field. Fire started in wings and quickly engulfled the whole
aircraft except cockpit and tail.

Of course Swissair 111 where fire started while still in the air.

Crashes where there is NO subsequent fire seems to be more the exception
rather than the rule. (I do not include belly landings under controlled
conditions).

Nobody schrieb:
me wrote:

My first thought was; how many aircraft of this size have an
accident in which the primary threat is the fire and fumes?

Most.

The Singapore 747 at taipei that took off from a runway under
contruction, hit a truck/barricade and then caughgt fire. Fire was the
biggest problem during evacuation of aircraft.

Recently, the Air France 340 at Toronto that overshot runway and ended
up in the field. Fire started in wings and quickly engulfled the whole
aircraft except cockpit and tail.

Plus just a few days ago the MD11 that went off the runway in Puket and
burnt out.

It seems that aluminium burns just as well as plastics do.

T.


Of course Swissair 111 where fire started while still in the air.

Crashes where there is NO subsequent fire seems to be more the exception
rather than the rule. (I do not include belly landings under controlled
conditions).

On Sep 19, 12:21 pm, Nobody wrote:
me wrote:
My first thought was; how many aircraft of this size have an
accident in which the primary threat is the fire and fumes?

Most.

The Singapore 747 at taipei that took off from a runway under
contruction, hit a truck/barricade and then caughgt fire. Fire was the
biggest problem during evacuation of aircraft.

Recently, the Air France 340 at Toronto that overshot runway and ended
up in the field. Fire started in wings and quickly engulfled the whole
aircraft except cockpit and tail.

Of course Swissair 111 where fire started while still in the air.

Crashes where there is NO subsequent fire seems to be more the exception
rather than the rule. (I do not include belly landings under controlled
conditions).

Well my point really was whether the fire (and fumes really) is
the primary problem. This guys primary concern is fuselage fire
near as I can make out. If your fuselage is on fire in flight,
it's probably not your primary problem (at that point). I thought
of the Toronto incident, but I couldn't remember if they all escaped
prior to any serious amount of fuselage fire. I'd forgotten about
the 747. I do remember the crash in Iowa (DC-10?) The
fuselage broke up and there was fire, although I'm not sure
it was a particular issue. I guess with fumes, it could have been.

On Sep 19, 11:28 am, Tom Peel wrote:

Plus just a few days ago the MD11 that went off the runway in Puket and
burnt out.

it was an MD-82, not an MD11.

Quark

Per Tom Peel:
It seems that aluminium burns just as well as plastics do.

Previous posts seem to suggest that a significant problem is
toxic fumes generated by the burning composites.
--
PeteCresswell

On 18 Sep, 22:57, (thom w) wrote:
Lots of points to talk about in here. Discuss.
But this guy going to Dan Rather with his complaints -- well, that kinda
destroys any credibility he might have.

Fired engineer calls 787's plastic fuselage unsafe

By Dominic Gates
Seattle Times aerospace reporter
Tuesday, September 18, 2007 - 12:00 AM

A former senior aerospace engineer at Boeing's Phantom Works research
unit, fired last year under disputed circumstances, is going public with
concerns that the new 787 Dreamliner is unsafe.

Forty-six-year veteran Vince Weldon contends that in a crash landing
that would be survivable in a metal airplane, the new jet's innovative
composite plastic materials will shatter too easily and burn with toxic
fumes. He backs up his views with e-mails from engineering colleagues at
Boeing and claims the company isn't doing enough to test the plane's
crashworthiness.

Boeing vigorously denies Weldon's assertions, saying the questions he
raised internally were addressed to the satisfaction of its technical
experts.

Weldon's allegations will be aired tonight by Dan Rather, the former CBS
News anchor, on his weekly investigative show on cable channel HDNet.

Weldon thinks that without years of further research, Boeing shouldn't
build the Dreamliner and that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
shouldn't certify the jet to fly.

Boeing's current compressed schedule calls for a six-month flight-test
program and federal certification in time for delivery in May.

Rather's show presents a letter Weldon wrote to the FAA in July
detailing his view, as well as two e-mails to Weldon dated August 2005
and February 2006, expressing similar safety concerns, from unidentified
senior Boeing engineers who are still at the company.
Weldon worked at a Boeing facility in Kent.

Within Boeing, he led structural design of a complex piece of the space
shuttle and supervised several advance design groups. He has worked with
composites since 1973.

Weldon recently declined through an intermediary to speak with The
Seattle Times.
Boeing confirms he was a senior engineer, but spokeswoman Lori Gunter
said he is not specifically a materials expert.

He complains in his July 24 letter to the FAA that when he expressed his
criticisms internally they were ignored and "well-covered up."

Weldon was fired in July 2006. He alleged in a whistle-blower complaint
with the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) that
the firing was "retaliation for raising concerns throughout the last two
years of his employment about the crashworthiness of the 787."

But according to a summary of OSHA's findings, Boeing told investigators
Weldon was fired for threatening a supervisor, specifically for stating
he wanted to hang the African-American executive "on a meat hook" and
that he "wouldn't mind" seeing a noose around the executive's neck.
Weldon denied to OSHA investigators that he had referred to a noose and
said the "meat hook" reference had not been a threat.

OSHA dismissed Weldon's claim, denying him whistle-blower status largely
on the grounds that Boeing's 787 design does not violate any FAA
regulations or standards.

FAA spokesman Mike Fergus said Monday the 787 will not be certified
unless it meets all the FAA's criteria, including a specific requirement
that Boeing prove passengers will have at least as good a chance of
surviving a crash landing as they would in current metal airliners.
Rather said Weldon had spoken out publicly only with great reluctance.

"We approached Weldon. In the beginning, it was not at all certain he
would cooperate," Rather said in an interview.

Rather said his show doesn't determine whether Boeing or Weldon is
right. But referring to the e-mails from Weldon's peers, he said,
"There are others who are still within the company who are concerned ...
that Boeing could be destroyed by taking the 787 to market too soon and
brushing aside these safety concerns too cavalierly."

The Seattle Times reviewed the program transcript and also the letter to
the FAA. In the letter, Weldon alleges:

· The brittleness of the plastic material from which the 787 fuselage
is built would create a more severe impact shock to passengers than an
aluminum plane, which absorbs impact in a crash by crumpling. A crash
also could shatter the plastic fuselage, creating a hole that would
allow smoke and toxic fumes to fill the passenger cabin.

· After such a crash landing, the composite plastic material burning
in a jet-fuel fire would create "highly toxic smoke and tiny inhalable
carbon slivers" that "would likely seriously incapacitate or kill
passengers."
Weldon also told the FAA this could also pose a major environmental
hazard in the area around the crash site.

· The recently conducted crashworthiness tests - in which Boeing
dropped partial fuselage sections from a height of about 15 feet at a
test site in Mesa, Ariz. - are inadequate and do not match the
stringency of comparable tests done on a 737 fuselage section in 2000.

· The conductive metal mesh embedded in the 787's fuselage surface to
conduct away lightning is too light and vulnerable to hail damage, and
is little better than a "Band-Aid."
Though aluminum airplanes are safe to fly through lightning storms,
Weldon wrote, "I do not have even close to the same level of confidence"
for the 787.

Boeing's Gunter denied the specifics in Weldon's Dreamliner critique.
"We have to demonstrate [to the FAA] comparable crashworthiness to
today's airplanes," she said. "We are doing that."

The recently completed crash tests were successful but are only the
beginning of a process that relies on computer modeling to cover every
possible crash scenario, she said.

Tests so far have shown that shards of composite material released in a
crash are not a shape that is easily inhaled, Gunter said, and the smoke
produced by composites in a jet-fuel fire is no more toxic than the
smoke from the crash of an aluminum plane.

The 787's lightning protection will meet FAA requirements, she said.

Gunter expressed frustration at Weldon's portrayal of the plane maker as
taking shortcuts for profit.

"We wouldn't create a product that isn't safe for the flying public,"
Gunter said. "We fly on those airplanes. Our children fly on those
airplanes."

Dominic Gates: 206-464-2963 or

I think we will never get the data until one crashes.

I hope that is unlikely so best alternative would be to do a crash
test.

787 vs 380.

On Fri, 21 Sep 2007 09:59:19 -0700 '
posted stuff on rec.travel.air:

[big snip]

I think we will never get the data until one crashes.

I hope that is unlikely so best alternative would be to do a crash
test.

787 vs 380.

What will such a comparison crash test prove?

I think we will never get the data until one crashes.

I hope that is unlikely so best alternative would be to do a crash
test.

787 vs 380.

What will such a comparison crash test prove?

I believe the composite argument ignores that such materials have a
substantial history of use in military aircraft. Granted, there are
design differences between military and commercial aircraft, but the
expereince to date does not indicate that composites are less
airworthy or less safe than aluminum-based airframes.

This goes abck a few years, but who was the engineer who spoke about
against the production of the 707? As I recall he said that such
aircraft would be too dangerous for commercial aviation.