Bush Scandal: Furor Over Secret Plans for Illegal Iraq War

A Heady Mix of Pride and Prejudice Led to War
By MICHIKO KAKUTANI
New York Times

Published: April 19, 2004

In his engrossing new book, "Plan of Attack," Bob Woodward uses myriad
details to chart the Bush administration's march to war against Iraq. His
often harrowing narrative not only illuminates the fateful interplay of
personality and policy among administration hawks and doves, but it also
underscores the role that fuzzy intelligence, Pentagon timetables and
aggressive ideas about military and foreign policy had in creating momentum
for war.

The chief of staff, Andrew H. Card Jr., describes the White House as trying
to perform a circus trick of straddling two horses, the horse of war and
the horse of diplomacy. It is a task, this book shows, that the White House
did with difficulty and at times a good deal of disingenuousness, with the
horse of war rapidly outpacing the horse of diplomacy. It is also a White
House committed to the "vision thing" in a big way (promoting risky,
sweeping ideas like exporting democracy and pre-emptive war) and the
avoidance of any perception of wimpiness, a White House in many ways
determined to avoid accusations once hurled at the president's father.

"Plan of Attack" reveals that President George W. Bush asked Defense
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld on Nov. 21, 2001, to start a war plan for
Iraq, and to do so in secret because a leak could trigger "enormous
international angst and domestic speculation." Among the first to express
angst was Gen. Tommy Franks, who got the Iraq assignment while he was busy
prosecuting the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The book also reveals that the director of Central Intelligence, George
Tenet, told President Bush in December 2002 that intelligence about Iraq
possessing weapons of mass destruction was "a slam dunk," but later told
associates that he and the C.I.A. should have stated up front in that
fall's National Intelligence Estimate and other reports that the evidence
was not ironclad, that there was no smoking gun.

In addition "Plan of Attack" ratifies assertions made in two recent
controversial books. It corroborates the observation made by the former
Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill (in Ron Suskind's book "The Price of
Loyalty") that Iraq was high on the Bush administration's agenda before
9/11, in fact from its very first days in office. And echoing accusations
made by the former counterterrorism czar Richard A. Clarke (in his book
"Against All Enemies"), it contends that prior to 9/11 Mr. Bush was
focusing on domestic issues and a large tax cut and had "largely ignored
the terrorism problem."

In the wake of Mr. Woodward's best-selling 2002 book "Bush at War" — which
presented a laudatory portrait of Mr. Bush as a fearless and determined
leader after 9/11 — the president agreed to be interviewed in depth by the
author about how and why he decided to go to war against Iraq. Mr.
Woodward, an assistant managing editor of The Washington Post, says the
president also made it clear that he wanted administration members to talk
with him, and that he interviewed more than 75 key players.

Thanks to this wide access, "Plan of Attack" has a more choral-like
narrative than many of the author's earlier books, which tended to spin
scenes from the point of view of his most voluble sources. And while Mr.
Woodward — who has long specialized in forward-leaning narratives that are
long on details and scoops, and short on analysis — does not delve into the
intellectual and political roots of the war cabinet, he does pause every
now and then to put his subjects' actions and statements into perspective.
The resulting volume is his most powerful and persuasive book in years.

In reporting that General Franks said in September 2002 that his people had
been "looking for Scud missiles and other weapons of mass destruction for
10 years and haven't found any yet," Mr. Woodward adds: "It could, and
should, have been a warning that if the intelligence was not good enough to
make bombing decisions, it probably was not good enough to make the broad
assertion, in public or in formal intelligence documents, that there was
`no doubt' Saddam had WMD." Vice President Dick Cheney had done exactly
that just days before.

Later Mr. Woodward observes that Secretary of State Colin Powell warned the
president in January 2003 that military action against Iraq would leave the
United States responsible for rebuilding the country and dealing with
whatever global fallout the invasion might cause, but adds that the
president never asked his top diplomat for advice, and that Mr. Powell
never volunteered any. "Perhaps the president feared the answer," Mr.
Woodward writes. "Perhaps Powell feared giving it. It would, after all,
have been an opportunity to say he disagreed. But they had not gotten to
that core question, and Powell would not push."

In contrast Mr. Woodward describes Mr. Cheney as having been a "powerful,
steamrolling force" for military intervention, "a rock," in President
Bush's words, who was "steadfast and steady in his view that Saddam was a
threat to America and we had to deal with him." The "self-appointed special
examiner of worst-case scenarios," Mr. Cheney, who had been defense
secretary during the first gulf war in 1991, harbored "a deep sense of
unfinished business about Iraq," Mr. Woodward writes, and in January 2001,
before the inauguration, he passed a message to the outgoing defense
secretary, William S. Cohen, stipulating that Topic A in Mr. Bush's foreign
policy briefing should be Iraq.

During the buildup to war, this book contends, tensions between Mr. Powell
and Mr. Cheney grew so toxic that the two men "could not, and did not, have
a sit-down lunch or any discussion about their differences." Mr. Powell is
described as thinking that the vice president had an unhealthy fixation on
Saddam Hussein and was constantly straining to draw (unproven) connections
between Al Qaeda and Iraq. As Mr. Woodward puts it: "Powell thought that
Cheney took intelligence and converted uncertainty and ambiguity into
fact."

As for Mr. Cheney, he reportedly complains to hawkish friends — at a dinner
party he and his wife gave on April 13, 2003, to celebrate the Marines'
arrival in Baghdad — that Mr. Powell "always had major reservations about
what we were trying to do." He and his friends are described as chuckling
about the secretary of state, whom Mr. Cheney characterizes as someone
interested in his own poll ratings and popularity.

President Bush, the object of so much jockeying for position among cabinet
members, emerges from this book as a more ambiguous figure than the
commanding leader portrayed by Mr. Woodward in "Bush at War." In some
scenes he is depicted as genuinely decisive (as in his choice to go to
United Nations in 2002). In others he seems merely childish (eyeing Gen.
Henry Shelton's peppermint during a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
until the general passed it over.)

Sometimes Mr. Bush comes across as instinctive and shrewd (dismissing a
C.I.A. presentation on weapons of mass destruction as "not something that
Joe Public would understand or would gain a lot of confidence from").
Sometimes he sounds petulant and defensive (saying of Mr. Powell, "I didn't
need his permission" to go to war). And sometimes he simply seems like
someone trying to live up to the "Persona" outlined by his political
adviser Karl Rove in a campaign brief: a "Strong Leader" with a penchant
for "Bold Action" and "Big Ideas."

Mr. Bush and the people around him — most notably Mr. Rove, Mr. Cheney, Mr.
Rumsfeld, the national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and Deputy Defense
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz — are constantly talking about the importance of
showing resolve, of standing firm, of talking the talk and walking the
walk. And as plans for war advance, this posture becomes part of the
momentum toward war. As Mr. Bush himself says of the weeks leading up to
the war: "I began to be concerned at the blowback coming out of America:
`Bush won't act. The leader that we thought was strong and straightforward
and clear-headed has now got himself in a position where he can't act.' And
it wasn't on the left. It was on the right."

Adding to the war momentum was the growing buildup of troops in the Iraq
theater, the approach of hot weather in the gulf (which would make military
operations more difficult), promises made to allies like Saudi Arabia
(Prince Bandar, Mr. Woodward reveals, was told of the president's decision
to go to war before Colin Powell was) and risky C.I.A. operations in the
region.

In the final walkup to war, Mr. Bush repeatedly asks associates: "What's my
last decision point?" "When have I finally made a commitment?" Mr. Rumsfeld
eventually tells the president, "The penalty for our country and for our
relationships and potentially the lives of some people are at risk if you
have to make a decision not to go forward."

By January 2003, this book reports, Mr. Bush had made up his mind to take
military action, but the book also suggests that that decision was far from
inevitable, given the many vagaries of intelligence findings, domestic and
international politics, and the personalities and maneuverings of the
people closest to the president.

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/19/bo...AKU.html?8hpib

"flop" wrote:
A Heady Mix of Pride and Prejudice Led to War
By MICHIKO KAKUTANI
New York Times

Published: April 19, 2004

In his engrossing new book, "Plan of Attack," Bob Woodward uses myriad
details to chart the Bush administration's march to war against Iraq. His
often harrowing narrative not only illuminates the fateful interplay of
personality and policy among administration hawks and doves, but it also
underscores the role that fuzzy intelligence, Pentagon timetables and
aggressive ideas about military and foreign policy had in creating
momentum
for war.

Oh please, Bob Woodward is a joke and everyone knows it. He got his 15
minutes of fame bringing down the Nixon White House and now he's desperately
trying to extend it. Now he wants to bring George Bush and his
Administration down. But it ain't gonna happen. George Bush had a mandate
from God, everyone knows that, and he accomplished it admirably, the proof
is we got Saddam Hussein. God is on our side, and after 9/11, you're either
with us or you're against us. Everyone in the world needs to ask
themselves, which side do you want to be on, the side of God and truth and
justice, or the side of the crazed lunatics and murderers terrorists and
jihadists? Everybody has to choose, we're living in a new era now.

The chief of staff, Andrew H. Card Jr., describes the White House as
trying
to perform a circus trick of straddling two horses, the horse of war and
the horse of diplomacy. It is a task, this book shows, that the White
House
did with difficulty and at times a good deal of disingenuousness, with the
horse of war rapidly outpacing the horse of diplomacy. It is also a White
House committed to the "vision thing" in a big way (promoting risky,
sweeping ideas like exporting democracy and pre-emptive war) and the
avoidance of any perception of wimpiness, a White House in many ways
determined to avoid accusations once hurled at the president's father.

"Plan of Attack" reveals that President George W. Bush asked Defense
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld on Nov. 21, 2001, to start a war plan for
Iraq, and to do so in secret because a leak could trigger "enormous
international angst and domestic speculation." Among the first to express
angst was Gen. Tommy Franks, who got the Iraq assignment while he was busy
prosecuting the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The book also reveals that the director of Central Intelligence, George
Tenet, told President Bush in December 2002 that intelligence about Iraq
possessing weapons of mass destruction was "a slam dunk," but later told
associates that he and the C.I.A. should have stated up front in that
fall's National Intelligence Estimate and other reports that the evidence
was not ironclad, that there was no smoking gun.

In addition "Plan of Attack" ratifies assertions made in two recent
controversial books. It corroborates the observation made by the former
Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill (in Ron Suskind's book "The Price of
Loyalty") that Iraq was high on the Bush administration's agenda before
9/11, in fact from its very first days in office. And echoing accusations
made by the former counterterrorism czar Richard A. Clarke (in his book
"Against All Enemies"), it contends that prior to 9/11 Mr. Bush was
focusing on domestic issues and a large tax cut and had "largely ignored
the terrorism problem."

In the wake of Mr. Woodward's best-selling 2002 book "Bush at War" - which
presented a laudatory portrait of Mr. Bush as a fearless and determined
leader after 9/11 - the president agreed to be interviewed in depth by the
author about how and why he decided to go to war against Iraq. Mr.
Woodward, an assistant managing editor of The Washington Post, says the
president also made it clear that he wanted administration members to talk
with him, and that he interviewed more than 75 key players.

Thanks to this wide access, "Plan of Attack" has a more choral-like
narrative than many of the author's earlier books, which tended to spin
scenes from the point of view of his most voluble sources. And while Mr.
Woodward - who has long specialized in forward-leaning narratives that are
long on details and scoops, and short on analysis - does not delve into
the
intellectual and political roots of the war cabinet, he does pause every
now and then to put his subjects' actions and statements into perspective.
The resulting volume is his most powerful and persuasive book in years.

In reporting that General Franks said in September 2002 that his people
had
been "looking for Scud missiles and other weapons of mass destruction for
10 years and haven't found any yet," Mr. Woodward adds: "It could, and
should, have been a warning that if the intelligence was not good enough
to
make bombing decisions, it probably was not good enough to make the broad
assertion, in public or in formal intelligence documents, that there was
`no doubt' Saddam had WMD." Vice President Dick Cheney had done exactly
that just days before.

Later Mr. Woodward observes that Secretary of State Colin Powell warned
the
president in January 2003 that military action against Iraq would leave
the
United States responsible for rebuilding the country and dealing with
whatever global fallout the invasion might cause, but adds that the
president never asked his top diplomat for advice, and that Mr. Powell
never volunteered any. "Perhaps the president feared the answer," Mr.
Woodward writes. "Perhaps Powell feared giving it. It would, after all,
have been an opportunity to say he disagreed. But they had not gotten to
that core question, and Powell would not push."

In contrast Mr. Woodward describes Mr. Cheney as having been a "powerful,
steamrolling force" for military intervention, "a rock," in President
Bush's words, who was "steadfast and steady in his view that Saddam was a
threat to America and we had to deal with him." The "self-appointed
special
examiner of worst-case scenarios," Mr. Cheney, who had been defense
secretary during the first gulf war in 1991, harbored "a deep sense of
unfinished business about Iraq," Mr. Woodward writes, and in January 2001,
before the inauguration, he passed a message to the outgoing defense
secretary, William S. Cohen, stipulating that Topic A in Mr. Bush's
foreign
policy briefing should be Iraq.

During the buildup to war, this book contends, tensions between Mr. Powell
and Mr. Cheney grew so toxic that the two men "could not, and did not,
have
a sit-down lunch or any discussion about their differences." Mr. Powell is
described as thinking that the vice president had an unhealthy fixation on
Saddam Hussein and was constantly straining to draw (unproven) connections
between Al Qaeda and Iraq. As Mr. Woodward puts it: "Powell thought that
Cheney took intelligence and converted uncertainty and ambiguity into
fact."

As for Mr. Cheney, he reportedly complains to hawkish friends - at a
dinner
party he and his wife gave on April 13, 2003, to celebrate the Marines'
arrival in Baghdad - that Mr. Powell "always had major reservations about
what we were trying to do." He and his friends are described as chuckling
about the secretary of state, whom Mr. Cheney characterizes as someone
interested in his own poll ratings and popularity.

President Bush, the object of so much jockeying for position among cabinet
members, emerges from this book as a more ambiguous figure than the
commanding leader portrayed by Mr. Woodward in "Bush at War." In some
scenes he is depicted as genuinely decisive (as in his choice to go to
United Nations in 2002). In others he seems merely childish (eyeing Gen.
Henry Shelton's peppermint during a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff,
until the general passed it over.)

Sometimes Mr. Bush comes across as instinctive and shrewd (dismissing a
C.I.A. presentation on weapons of mass destruction as "not something that
Joe Public would understand or would gain a lot of confidence from").
Sometimes he sounds petulant and defensive (saying of Mr. Powell, "I
didn't
need his permission" to go to war). And sometimes he simply seems like
someone trying to live up to the "Persona" outlined by his political
adviser Karl Rove in a campaign brief: a "Strong Leader" with a penchant
for "Bold Action" and "Big Ideas."

Mr. Bush and the people around him - most notably Mr. Rove, Mr. Cheney,
Mr.
Rumsfeld, the national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and Deputy
Defense
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz - are constantly talking about the importance of
showing resolve, of standing firm, of talking the talk and walking the
walk. And as plans for war advance, this posture becomes part of the
momentum toward war. As Mr. Bush himself says of the weeks leading up to
the war: "I began to be concerned at the blowback coming out of America:
`Bush won't act. The leader that we thought was strong and straightforward
and clear-headed has now got himself in a position where he can't act.'
And
it wasn't on the left. It was on the right."

Adding to the war momentum was the growing buildup of troops in the Iraq
theater, the approach of hot weather in the gulf (which would make
military
operations more difficult), promises made to allies like Saudi Arabia
(Prince Bandar, Mr. Woodward reveals, was told of the president's decision
to go to war before Colin Powell was) and risky C.I.A. operations in the
region.

In the final walkup to war, Mr. Bush repeatedly asks associates: "What's
my
last decision point?" "When have I finally made a commitment?" Mr.
Rumsfeld
eventually tells the president, "The penalty for our country and for our
relationships and potentially the lives of some people are at risk if you
have to make a decision not to go forward."

By January 2003, this book reports, Mr. Bush had made up his mind to take
military action, but the book also suggests that that decision was far
from
inevitable, given the many vagaries of intelligence findings, domestic and
international politics, and the personalities and maneuverings of the
people closest to the president.

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/19/bo...AKU.html?8hpib

"Daniel" wrote in message ...

God is on our side, and after 9/11, you're either
with us or you're against us. Everyone in the world needs to ask
themselves, which side do you want to be on, the side of God and truth and
justice, or the side of the crazed lunatics and murderers terrorists and
jihadists? Everybody has to choose, we're living in a new era now.


Um ... okay ... but what I can't figure out is ... which side is which?????

Terryo wrote:

"Daniel" wrote in message ...


God is on our side, and after 9/11, you're either
with us or you're against us. Everyone in the world needs to ask
themselves, which side do you want to be on, the side of God and truth and
justice, or the side of the crazed lunatics and murderers terrorists and
jihadists? Everybody has to choose, we're living in a new era now.



Um ... okay ... but what I can't figure out is ... which side is which?????


It's EASY! The *other* guys are insane.


mike


The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and
hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless
series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary.
H. L. Mencken

Daniel wrote:

"flop" wrote:

A Heady Mix of Pride and Prejudice Led to War
By MICHIKO KAKUTANI
New York Times

Published: April 19, 2004

In his engrossing new book, "Plan of Attack," Bob Woodward uses myriad
details to chart the Bush administration's march to war against Iraq. His
often harrowing narrative not only illuminates the fateful interplay of
personality and policy among administration hawks and doves, but it also
underscores the role that fuzzy intelligence, Pentagon timetables and
aggressive ideas about military and foreign policy had in creating

momentum

for war.


Oh please, Bob Woodward is a joke and everyone knows it. He got his 15
minutes of fame bringing down the Nixon White House and now he's desperately
trying to extend it. Now he wants to bring George Bush and his
Administration down. But it ain't gonna happen. George Bush had a mandate
from God, everyone knows that, and he accomplished it admirably, the proof
is we got Saddam Hussein. God is on our side, and after 9/11, you're either
with us or you're against us. Everyone in the world needs to ask
themselves, which side do you want to be on, the side of God and truth and
justice, or the side of the crazed lunatics and murderers terrorists and
jihadists? Everybody has to choose, we're living in a new era now.


Good troll. Very realistic, yet teetering on the razor's edge.

--
Baldin Pramer

"'Hello', he lied." Dorothy Parker

"Daniel"
The Lord thy God is with you, but are you with Him?
Prove your faith in His Word!, can you?
Go as your namesake did into the den of the Lion and show Him your trust in
His Word.
Go now Daniel, do not hold back from this mission to show the World your
absolute faith in His Word.
For you shall sit on the right hand of God for all eternity.

Daniel wrote:

"flop" wrote:

A Heady Mix of Pride and Prejudice Led to War
By MICHIKO KAKUTANI
New York Times

Published: April 19, 2004

In his engrossing new book, "Plan of Attack," Bob Woodward uses myriad
details to chart the Bush administration's march to war against Iraq. His
often harrowing narrative not only illuminates the fateful interplay of
personality and policy among administration hawks and doves, but it also
underscores the role that fuzzy intelligence, Pentagon timetables and
aggressive ideas about military and foreign policy had in creating

momentum

for war.


Oh please, Bob Woodward is a joke and everyone knows it. He got his 15
minutes of fame bringing down the Nixon White House and now he's desperately
trying to extend it. Now he wants to bring George Bush and his
Administration down.

oh please -- Woodward has been a toy poodle for the Bush White House --
his last book was a totally uncritical puff piece --- and he isn ow busy
backing away from his reporting here because he is so anxious for
'access' that truth is no longer of interest

But it ain't gonna happen. George Bush had a mandate
from God, everyone knows that, and he accomplished it admirably, the proof
is we got Saddam Hussein. God is on our side, and after 9/11, you're either
with us or you're against us. Everyone in the world needs to ask
themselves, which side do you want to be on, the side of God and truth and
justice, or the side of the crazed lunatics and murderers terrorists and
jihadists? Everybody has to choose, we're living in a new era now.



god sure seems to be pretty inept in this Iraq deal though doesn't he?

In article , (jenn)
wrote:

Daniel wrote:
Oh please, Bob Woodward is a joke and everyone knows it. He got his
15
minutes of fame bringing down the Nixon White House and now he's
desperately
trying to extend it. Now he wants to bring George Bush and his
Administration down.

oh please -- Woodward has been a toy poodle for the Bush White House --
his last book was a totally uncritical puff piece --- and he isn ow
busy backing away from his reporting here because he is so anxious for
'access' that truth is no longer of interest

I'm not sure I wholly agree with that; "puff piece" implies deliberate
puffing and I wouldn't go that far. I think you're spot on with the
suggestion that he values access more than alternative versions of the
story, though. Ironically, given his early career, he's star-struck by the
Presidency.